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[This article aims to identify jurisprudence which advances the standards of treatment of 
unauthorised migrants in the context of often hostile domestic laws and political rhetoric. Due to 
its universalist and humanist underpinnings, many would consider international human rights 
law to be a natural source of rights protecting migrant workers. However, human rights doctrine 
takes a chequered approach to the protection of those living or working in a foreign state without 
visa authorisation. Even the Migrant Workers Convention recognises states’ sovereign 
prerogative over immigration control, and thereby fails to cater to the especially precarious 
position of irregular migrants who decline to assert their rights for fear of facing sanctions under 
immigration laws. It is argued that we need to look to regional judicial forums to find 
international legal doctrine which articulates a progressive legal framework robustly protective 
of irregular migrants’ rights. This article canvasses jurisprudence in the regional Human Rights 
Courts in Europe and the Americas which succeeds, in different ways, at decoupling the absolute 
discretion of states to regulate border control from the substantive rights of irregular migrants 
once present in a host state.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
International migration featured high on the United Nations’ agenda in 2006, 
when, on 14 and 15 September, government delegations from around the world 
met for the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development.1 This same year saw hundreds of thousands of 
people lining the streets of Los Angeles with placards proclaiming ‘no human is 
illegal’.2 Clearly, international migration has become the subject of urgent policy 
debate within many countries and at the international level. It is equally evident 
that no single issue is more contentious than that of the movement of people 
without state authorisation, described in international parlance as ‘irregular 
migration’.3 
As the Australian Government attempts to guard against the entry of asylum 
seekers arriving by boat,4 even ‘fortress Australia’5 is not insulated from 
irregular (or ‘undocumented’) migrants. In December 2005, there were 
approximately 46 400 visa overstayers in Australia,6 together with an unknown 
number of non-citizens present in Australia with valid visas who were working 
in breach of their visa conditions.7 In current Australian public debate, as in most 
Western countries, irregular migrants are maligned as ‘economic migrants’8 — 
less deserving even than refugees because the circumstances precipitating their 
arrival in Australia are not considered to found a legitimate claim to stay on 
                                                 
 1 See Summary of the High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, 
Note by the President of the General Assembly, UN GAOR, 61st sess, Agenda Item 55(b), 
UN Doc A/61/515 (13 October 2006). 
 2 Not in Our Name Steering Committee, No Human is Illegal! (2006) 
<http://www.notinourname.net/archive/immigrant-justice-10apr06.htm> at 18 May 2007. 
 3 See, eg, Global Commission on International Migration, Migration in an Interconnected 
World: New Directions for Action (October 2005) 32, available from 
<http://www.gcim.org> at 18 May 2007; Summary of the High-Level Dialogue on 
International Migration and Development, Note by the President of the General Assembly, 
UN GAOR, 61st sess, Agenda Item 55(b), UN Doc A/61/515 (13 October 2006). 
 4 See, eg, Jewel Topsfield, ‘Nauru Sets Six-Month Limit on Asylum Seekers’, The Age 
(Melbourne, Australia) 20 March 2007, 6. 
 5 See Margo Kingston, ‘Fortress Australia — The Implications’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney, Australia) 3 September 2001 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/11/26/ 
1069522644875.html> at 18 May 2007. 
 6 Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Commonwealth of Australia, Fact Sheet 86: 
Overstayers and People in Breach of Visa Conditions (2007), available from 
<http://www.immi.gov.au> at 18 May 2007. In 1999, the Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs estimated that half of all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ were engaged in paid 
employment: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Review of Illegal Workers in Australia: Improving Immigration Compliance in 
the Workplace (1999) 18. 
 7 Auditor-General, Australian National Audit Office, Onshore Compliance — Visa 
Overstayers and Non-Citizens Working Illegally (Audit Report No 2, 2004–05) [4]. 
 8 See, eg, Paul Kelly, ‘Australia Beyond 2001 — Towards a New National Project’ (Speech 
delivered at the American Australian Association, New York City, US, 26 April 2002) [14] 
<http://www.americanaustralian.org/Corporate/pdf/speech_paul_kelly.pdf> at 18 May 2007; 
Rosie Goldsmith, ‘Australia’s Great Immigration Debate’, BBC News (UK) 24 October 
2001 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/crossing_continents/asia/1613538.stm> at 
18 May 2007. See also Wendi Adelson, ‘Economic Migrants and Political Asylum Seekers 
in the United Kingdom: Crafting the Difference’ (2004) 1 Michigan Journal of Public 
Affairs <http://www.mjpa.umich.edu/uploads/Volume_1_Migrants_Article_Final.pdf> at 
18 May 2007. 
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Australian soil.9 As irregular migrants have not been extended the privilege of 
entry into Australian territory, enforcement plays a dominant role in political 
discourse.10 Those who advocate for the rights of undocumented migrant 
workers are often blocked by the hold that the mantra of border control has on 
the popular psyche.  
This article has the practical goal of identifying jurisprudence which advances 
the standards of treatment of unauthorised migrants in the context of often hostile 
domestic laws and political rhetoric. It is hoped that this article will fuel a more 
sophisticated public debate about the conceptual frameworks necessary to protect 
the rights of undocumented migrant workers. It is also envisaged that this 
research will contribute to the arsenal of advocates’ tools as they challenge the 
prevailing view that decent treatment of migrants must always be sublimated to 
states’ wide-ranging powers over their borders and immigrant admissions. 
Additionally, examples of laws insisting on decent treatment of irregular 
migrants may form the basis for a positive framework of rights protection of this 
vulnerable population by courts and law-makers.  
Many would consider international law to be a natural source of rights 
protecting migrant workers, including those living or working without 
authorisation. This is because undocumented migrant workers have no access to 
domestic electoral processes in their states of employment, and often resist 
reporting exploitative living and working conditions to domestic authorities (or 
seeking judicial redress) for fear of attracting the attention of immigration 
enforcement authorities. International law, somewhat insulated from domestic 
debates over immigration policies, might therefore be better placed to provide 
positive guidance on the treatment of individuals who form part of the global 
movement of labourers, and who have no access to their own states for 
protection. 
However, when one examines international human rights legal principles, the 
result is not progressive doctrine, but rather a deep uncertainty about the legal 
protections afforded to irregular migrants. As states parties jealously guard 
control of their territory and national membership, they have adopted UN 
Conventions which emphasise states’ sovereign control over their borders, and 
their absolute prerogative to control admission and deportation of unauthorised 
migrants.11 By and large, comprehensive human rights instruments do not 
explicitly include the protection of irregular migrants; moreover, they explicitly 
exclude this group from certain rights afforded to authorised immigrants or 
nationals of the state of residence.12 When the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
                                                 
 9 See Adelson, above n 8, 1.  
 10 See, eg, the second reading speeches accompanying the passage of the Migration 
Amendment (Employer Sanctions) Act 2007 (Cth): Commonwealth of Australia, 
Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 29 March 2006, 2–3 (Nick Minchin, Minister for Finance 
and Administration); Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives, 29 November 2006, 135–7 (Andrew Robb, Minister for Vocational and 
Further Education). See also Review of Illegal Workers in Australia, above n 6. 
 11 See below Part III(A). 
 12 Linda Bosniak, ‘Human Rights, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Undocumented 
Migrants under the International Migrant Workers Convention’ (1991) 25 International 
Migration Review 737, 739. 
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(‘Migrant Workers Convention’)13 entered into force, the inclusion of all migrant 
workers in the human rights corpus was acclaimed as an unprecedented 
affirmation of the dignity of undocumented migrants.14 However, as will be 
explored in some detail below, the Migrant Workers Convention continues to 
allow states the absolute prerogative to pursue any immigration control policies 
they see fit. Linda Bosniak has argued that this deference to state interests means 
that the substantive rights afforded to irregular migrants may be unenforceable in 
practice.15  
It seems that, in order to find international legal doctrine which mediates state 
sovereignty and migrants’ rights with more regard to the needs of migrant 
workers, we need to look to regional judicial forums. Perhaps this is because 
these are still more distant from the influence of states and the overriding goal of 
preserving territorial sovereignty. Jurisprudence is emerging in regional human 
rights courts in Europe and the Americas which affirms the right of states to 
prohibit the entry of foreigners onto their sovereign territory, but also succeeds, 
in different ways, at decoupling the absolute discretion of states to regulate entry 
at the border from the substantive rights of irregular migrant workers once 
present in their countries of employment.16  
I explore this argument in three stages. Part II begins with a brief outline of 
some of the bases upon which it has been asserted that undocumented workers 
are entitled to protection in their states of employment and redress for the 
exploitation they experience. I then discuss why international human rights law 
might appear at first to be a natural repository of checks on states’ discretion 
when it comes to the treatment of irregular migrants.  
Nevertheless, in Part III, I will proceed to demonstrate that a review of treaty 
standards — in both the comprehensive human rights instruments and the 
dedicated migrant-oriented Migrant Workers Convention — disclose a deep 
ambivalence towards the ability of undocumented migrants to enforce their 
rights. This ambivalence often allows sovereign discretion over immigration 
control policies to trump any of the few rights which irregular migrants do hold 
under these treaties. I suggest that states have intentionally drafted and endorsed 
treaties which accord a great deal of deference to the plenary power of 
governments to resist unauthorised entries.  
Part IV then proposes that international or regional judicial tribunals may be 
better placed to articulate protective measures for irregular migrants, since they 
are further removed from the sovereign control of states. This contention is 
supported by an exploration of recent case law emanating from the European 
Court of Human Rights (‘ECHR’) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (‘IACHR’). This case law recognises that irregular migrants hold 
substantive rights opposable against their host state and require states to 
sequester migrants’ unlawful immigration status from their ability to claim these 
rights. This judicially mediated doctrine suggests different ways in which a 
uniquely vulnerable class of claimants may be empowered without totally 
abdicating states’ traditional prerogative over immigration enforcement. 
                                                 
 13 Opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2003). 
 14 Bosniak, above n 12, 740, 758. 
 15 Ibid 742. 
 16 See below Part IV. 
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II THE RIGHTS OF IRREGULAR MIGRANTS AND THE PROMISE OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 
Irregular or undocumented migrants are people who work in a state of 
employment without authorisation.17 To borrow from the internationally 
enshrined definition, irregular migrants may have entered without authorisation, 
be employed contrary to their visa stipulations, or have entered with permission 
but remained after their visas expired.18 However, treaty definitions aside, it is 
difficult to address this topic without becoming mired in inflammatory and 
politically-charged terminology.19 Individuals working in a foreign state without 
authorisation have been variously described as illegals,20 criminal aliens21 and 
unlawful non-citizens.22 It has been observed that the ‘collection of pejorative 
terms, racial slurs and denigrating epithets appear to have no end’.23  
As an alternative, in 1994, the International Conference on Population and 
Development recommended the use of the term ‘undocumented’.24 However, 
this word does not ‘cover migrants who enter the host country legally with 
tourist documents but later violate their conditions of entry by taking a job’.25 In 
light of this, the International Symposium on Migration in Bangkok in April 
1999 recommended use of the term ‘irregular’.26 This is intended to capture the 
fact that ‘[i]rregularities in migration can arise at various points — departure, 
transit, entry and return — and they may be committed against the migrant or by 
                                                 
 17 Migration in an Interconnected World, above n 3, 32. 
 18 Article 5 of the Migrant Workers Convention, above n 13, states that migrant workers and 
members of their families: 
(a) Are considered as documented or in a regular situation if they are authorized 
to enter, to stay and to engage in a remunerated activity in the State of 
employment pursuant to the law of that State and to international agreements 
to which that State is a party;  
(b) Are considered as non-documented or in an irregular situation if they do not 
comply with the conditions provided for in subparagraph (a) of the present 
article. 
 19 See, eg, Kevin R Johnson, ‘“Aliens” and the US Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal 
Construction of Nonpersons’ (1996–97) 28 University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 
263, 279; Elspeth Guild, ‘Who is an Irregular Migrant?’ in Barbara Bogusz et al (eds), 
Irregular Migration and Human Rights: Theoretical, European and International 
Perspectives (2004) 3. 
 20 See, eg, Edward Barnes, ‘Slaves of New York: How Crime and Mismanaged Laws Have 
Made the City the Biggest Magnet for Chinese Illegals’, Time (New York City, US) 2 
November 1998, 72 (discussing the situation of Chinese ‘illegals’ in New York); ‘“Illegals” 
to be Deported’, ABC News Online (Australia) 29 June 2004, available from 
<http://www.abc.net.au> at 18 May 2007. 
 21 See, eg, Jerry Seper, ‘Illegal Criminal Aliens abound in US’, The Washington Times 
(Washington DC, US) 26 January 2004, A01. 
 22 See, eg, ‘Suicidal Boy Didn’t Need Psychiatrist, Court Told’, The Sydney Morning Herald 
(Sydney, Australia) 28 July 2003 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/07/28/ 
1059244548741.html> at 18 May 2007 (referring to a suicidal child as an ‘unlawful 
non-citizen’). 
 23 Jorge A Vargas, ‘US Border Patrol Abuses, Undocumented Mexican Workers, and 
International Human Rights’ (2001) 2 San Diego International Law Journal 1, 29. 
 24 International Labour Office, ‘Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global 
Economy’ (Report VI presented at the International Labour Conference, 92nd sess, Report 
VI, Agenda Item 6, Geneva, 1–17 June 2004) 11. 
 25 Ibid. 
 26 Ibid. 
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the migrant’.27 I adopt the descriptors ‘undocumented’, ‘unauthorised’ or 
‘irregular’ migrant worker in an effort to avoid dehumanising language. Irregular 
migrants have committed mere administrative violations by breaking 
immigration laws in their country of employment. In the words of Judge Ramírez 
of the IACHR, ‘[w]hat should be an administrative description with well-defined 
effects becomes a “label” that results in many disadvantages and exposes the 
bearer to innumerable abuses’.28 Catherine Dauvergne has remarked that the 
nomenclature of ‘illegal’ ‘names the other not only as an outsider to a particular 
nation, but as an outsider to any nation. As such, the other is outside the law 
itself, and, in a word, illegal’.29 In sum, it is imperative to avoid labels that 
suggest a lack of legal existence which is both discriminatory and counterfactual. 
A Arguments for the Need to Protect Irregular Migrants 
Living on the fringes of society, undocumented migrants assume an extremely 
precarious life within their states of employment. In many parts of the world, 
they are among the lowest paid and hardest worked employees in the 
workforce.30 Due to their unlawful status, irregular migrants live in constant fear 
of removal, and are thus especially vulnerable to exploitation. The Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants has reported abusive working 
conditions, such as extremely long hours without breaks, refusal to pay wages 
due, ill-treatment and confinement, which amount, in some cases, to forced 
labour.31 States around the world tend to explicitly exclude irregular migrants 
from access to civil and labour rights and social benefits, adopting rhetoric which 
conflates immigrants and asylum seekers with criminals and terrorists. For 
example, shortly after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the former US 
Attorney-General John Ashcroft was heard to declare, ‘[l]et the terrorists among 
us be warned … If you overstay your visas even by one day, we will arrest 
you’.32 It is, therefore, unsurprising that undocumented migrants often resist 
asserting the rights they are entitled to for fear of exposure to immigration 
authorities.  
However, while their living and working conditions are marginal, the size of 
the irregular migrant worker population worldwide is certainly not. In 2005, an 
                                                 
 27 Ibid. 
 28 IACHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion) 
18 (ser A) (2003) [11] (Concurring Opinion of Judge Ramírez). 
 29 Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Making People Illegal’ in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), 
Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global Subject (2003) 83, 84. 
 30 Bosniak, above n 12, 737. 
 31 Jorge Bustamante, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/73 (30 December 
2005) [47]. 
 32 Dan Eggen, ‘Tough Anti-Terror Campaign Pledged; Ashcroft Tells Mayors He Will Use 
New Law to Fullest Extent’, The Washington Post (Washington DC, US) 26 October 2001, 
A01. 
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estimated 191 million people were international migrants.33 The International 
Labour Organization has calculated the number of ‘economically active 
migrants’ around the world at over 86 million.34 Although precise data relating 
to clandestine activities is impossible to ascertain, current knowledge puts 
irregular migration for Europe at about 10–15 per cent of all cross-border 
movement.35  
Clearly, some academics and many governments consider the prospect of 
extending substantial rights to irregular migrants extremely problematic.36 It is 
outside the scope of this article to provide a fully-fledged argument for the robust 
protection of the rights of undocumented migrants. Nevertheless, a range of 
rationales for advancing the rights and dignity of irregular migrants shape the 
legal standards of protection that do exist in both domestic and international legal 
regimes. Just as influential are the tensions or presuppositions implicit in these 
rationales. For this reason, it is necessary, briefly, to canvass the grounds 
anchoring the promotion of the rights of undocumented migrants. These include 
normative arguments as well as those based on pragmatic expediency. 
Human rights advocates predictably invoke the universal values underpinning 
the human rights regime.37 Some point to the extreme social vulnerability of the 
undocumented migrant population, who undertake work ubiquitously described 
as the ‘three Ds’ — dirty, degrading and dangerous38 — work that nationals and 
legal migrants avoid. The sectors which employ migrant workers are usually 
those where little or no regulatory activity upholds minimum safety, health and 
                                                 
 33 UN Secretary-General, International Migration and Development: Report of the 
Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 60th sess, Agenda Item 54c, UN Doc A/60/871 (19 May 
2005) [43]. The Commission on Human Security put the figure at 175 million, comprising 
3 per cent of the world’s population in 2000: Commission on Human Security, Human 
Security Now (2003) 41, available from <http://humansecurity-chs.org> at 18 May 2007. 
According to the International Organization for Migration, the total number of migrants in 
the world more than doubled between the years 1965 to 2000, from 75 to 175 million 
people. The projections for the future are that this total will continue to increase: 
International Organization for Migration, World Migration 2003: Managing Migration — 
Challenges and Responses for People on the Move (IOM World Migration Report Series, 
vol 2, 2003) 4–5. 
 34 International Labour Office, ‘Towards a Fair Deal for Migrant Workers in the Global 
Economy’, above n 24, [19]. 
 35 Ibid [37]. See also Timothy Hatton and Jeffrey Williamson, ‘What Fundamentals Drive 
World Migration?’ (NBER Working Paper No 9159, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2002) 3 <http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
jwilliam/papers/w9159.pdf> at 18 May 2007.  
 36 In the view of Schuck and Smith, undocumented aliens entering a state’s territory without 
consent are strangers to the social contract that binds the national community: Peter Schuck 
and Rogers Smith, Citizenship without Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity (1985) 
130–40. The Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, evoked similar sentiments in his 
2001 election slogan: ‘We will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come’: John Howard (Address delivered at the Federal Liberal Party Campaign 
Launch, Sydney, Australia, 28 October 2001). 
 37 See, eg, Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Migrants, Specific 
Groups and Individuals: Migrant Workers, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/76 (12 January 2004) 
[17].  
 38 Antoine Pécoud and Paul de Guchteneire, Migration, Human Rights and the United 
Nations: An Investigation into the Low Ratification Record of the UN Migrant Workers 
Convention (Global Migration Perspectives Series No 3, UN Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization, October 2004) 3. 
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working conditions that should ensure ‘decent work’.39 Those who articulate 
claims for migrants’ rights on the basis of universal values tend to recall the 
particular concern that the international community has shown for groups 
experiencing extreme social vulnerability, including the undocumented.40 
Other arguments in favour of promoting the rights of undocumented migrants 
rest on structural analyses of irregular migration flows. According to one such 
argument, many receiving countries welcome the physical labour of foreigners, 
but rigidly restrict the number of legally issued visas for blue-collar workers to 
migrate legally, making the existence of undocumented workers inevitable.41 
According to another, even while countries overtly combat clandestine 
immigration, irregular migration ‘is often tacitly permitted or even encouraged 
[by governments and employers], just because illegals lack rights and are easy to 
exploit’.42 Such encouragement may result from geopolitical and transnational 
economic dynamics based on older colonial patterns.43 Alternatively, 
encouragement may take the form of permeable borders. Although states wield 
extensive authority under international law to control the entry of foreigners into 
their territory, in practice, states often fail to exercise this control.44 Such failures 
to prevent the presence of tens of millions of irregular migrants around the world 
could be understood as tacit invitations to enter. Analytically, these contributions 
reject portrayals of irregular migrants as voluntary transgressors of state 
immigration laws,45 and emphasise the complicity of receiving states and local 
employers in the entrance and continued presence of irregular migrants.  
Others argue that irregular migrant workers are, in certain respects, de facto 
members of the national community by virtue of their social and cultural 
contributions.46 Generally, the thrust of these arguments is that states and 
employers should not be entitled to benefit from the labour of irregular migrant 
workers without according them some degree of entitlement to participate in the 
political and social community, including access to fundamental rights and 
protections. Correspondingly, ‘the community should keep its end of the 
unwritten compact by extending the undocumented legal recognition and certain 
basic rights’.47 
Consequentialist arguments, on the other hand, seek to demonstrate that 
guaranteeing undocumented migrants’ rights serves the interests of not only the 
                                                 
 39 Ibid 3–4. 
 40 Migrant Workers Convention, above n 13, preamble. 
 41 Beth Lyon, ‘New International Human Rights Standards on Unauthorised Immigrant 
Worker Rights: Seizing an Opportunity to Pull Governments Out of the Shadows’ in Anne 
Bayefsky (ed), Human Rights and Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrant 
Workers: Essays in Memory of Joan Fitzpatrick and Arthur Helton (2005) 551, 552.  
 42 Stephen Castles and Alastair Davidson, Citizenship and Migration: Globalization and the 
Politics of Belonging (2000) 73. 
 43 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (1996) 76–8. 
 44 Bosniak, above n 12, 737. 
 45 Sarah Paoletti, ‘Human Rights for All Workers: The Emergence of Protection for 
Unauthorized Workers in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2004) 12(1) Human 
Rights Brief 5, 5. 
 46 IACHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants (Advisory Opinion) 
18 (ser A) (2003) [6] (Concurring Opinion of Judge Ramírez). 
 47 Bosniak, above n 12, 750. See Joseph Carens, ‘Membership and Morality: Admission to 
Citizenship in Liberal Democratic States’ in William Rogers Brubaker (ed), Immigration 
and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America (1989) 31, 32–3, 43–4. 
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migrants, but those of the state and its citizens as well.48 Enforcing minimum 
standards of working conditions, for example, wage rates, is thought to remove 
employers’ incentives to seek out irregular migrant labour.49 In the words of one 
long-time community advocate, refusing legal redress for abuses experienced by 
irregular migrant workers simply serves to  
embolden lawbreakers who prey on immigrants, frustrate civil and criminal law 
enforcement generally, undermine public safety and health, entrench 
undocumented immigrants in a caste hierarchy, and foster an underground 
economy that depresses the terms and conditions of employment for all 
workers.50 
Naturally, there are policy-makers, politicians and community representatives 
who contest the suggestion that irregular migrants receive anything other than 
summary deportation. Normatively, some legal theorists and political 
philosophers have expressed the belief that national communities are constituted 
on the basis of shared values and culture, and that protecting this unique 
character requires communities to have absolute discretion over the admission of 
foreigners and the terms on which they are to be welcomed.51 Others reject the 
notion of rights of membership, including protection of laws and access to 
forums to assert those rights, without the prior consent of the polity (whether 
manifested as an entry visa, a licence to permanently reside, or full 
citizenship).52 In instrumental terms, many public opinion-shapers — from 
government policy-makers to tabloids — see rights as improper rewards for 
irregular migrants’ violations of a state’s territorial borders. Punitive immigration 
control measures, on the other hand, are believed to deter further irregular 
migration, thereby eliminating the potential for exploitation of irregular 
migrants.  
                                                 
 48 See, eg, Owen Fiss ‘The Immigrant as Pariah’ (1998) 23 (October/November) Boston 
Review <http://bostonreview.net/BR23.5/Fiss.html> at 18 May 2007.  
 49 Secretary of State for the Home Department, Human Trafficking (Command Paper 6996, 
Government Reply to the Twenty-Sixth Report From the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, session 2005–06, HL Paper 245, HC 1127, 19 December 2006) [13], available from 
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk> at 18 May 2007.  
 50 Michael J Wishnie, ‘Immigrants and the Right to Petition’ (2003) 78 New York University 
Law Review 667, 670 (citation omitted). 
 51 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (1983) 32. Peter 
Schuck argues that: 
Since the ideal of nationhood first fired the human imagination, a country’s power to 
decide unilaterally who may enter its domain, under what conditions, and with what 
legal consequences has been regarded as an essential precondition of its 
independence and sovereignty. 
Peter Schuck, Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship 
(1998), 19. 
 52 Schuck and Smith, above n 36, 131–40. 
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B The Promise of Human Rights Law 
As mentioned above, the aim of this article is to furnish migrants’ rights 
advocates with positive examples of jurisprudential practice in order to challenge 
the crude utilitarian premises of arguments opposing immigrants’ rights. In this 
vein, Beth Lyon recently issued a call in the US for comparative work on the 
ways in which legal regimes affect unauthorised immigrant workers — the aim 
of such a comparison being the proposal of conceptual frameworks for 
transnational and regional bodies, and to directly influence national policy 
pertaining to the legal treatment of undocumented immigrant workforces.53 In 
the face of inadequate domestic safeguards protecting individuals’ rights, 
international human rights law holds much promise as a source of progressive 
standards. As will be explained, however, the ambivalence of the actual 
standards provided by human rights law belies this promise. 
General principles of human rights law occupy an important place in legal 
strategies to constrain government abuse and the promulgation of unjust 
domestic laws. Among other ways in which sovereignty is being steadily eroded, 
many point out that nations are increasingly called to account for their actions 
politically and are occasionally also held to account legally. For example, Harold 
Koh has discerned a trend towards a transnational legal justice system in which 
the national and the international increasingly merge.54 Those who share his 
vision point to the proliferation of human rights treaties since the end of the 
Second World War, and the evolution of international enforcement mechanisms 
as vital developments in this trend. 
Faith in international human rights standards might seem even more natural in 
the context of an inherently transnational phenomenon such as immigration. 
Yasemin Soysal has expressed a strong belief in the growing impact of 
international human rights law on immigration policy. Soysal argues that there 
has been a reconfiguration of citizenship from a more particularistic notion based 
on nationhood to a more universalistic one based on personhood.55 As a result, 
according to Soysal, immigrants are increasingly granted rights that used to 
belong solely to nationals, thereby heralding a new post-national model of 
membership short of citizenship, which ‘derive[s] from transnational discourse 
and structures celebrating human rights as a world-level organizing principle’.56 
David Jacobson also links the failure of the state to control migration with the 
rise of an international human rights regime. In his view, ‘the basis of state 
legitimacy is shifting from principles of sovereignty and national 
self-determination to international human rights’.57  
Others are more cautious about the potential of international human rights 
law. Saskia Sassen argues that while external economic pressures and human 
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rights may constrain some elements of restrictive executive control policies, such 
constraints do not limit states’ discretion when dealing with undocumented 
migrants.58 Others, like Christian Joppke, consider that excessive reliance on 
international standards downplays the complexity and diversity of domestic legal 
norms on the basis of which immigrants have been accorded rights.59 Catherine 
Dauvergne adds that the enforcement of international human rights still depends 
upon a venue in which to lay claim to them,60 displacing authority back to the 
domestic legal field. In relation to domestic litigation, it has been argued that the 
enforcement difficulties which plague international law meant that 
‘[i]nternational human rights arguments are often seen as the advocates’ last 
refuge, pulled out only when there is no other authority to cite’.61 This 
observation seems equally astute in relation to the political arena of public 
domestic advocacy. 
However, it is my contention that international law remains a crucial site for 
migrants’ rights advocacy and should not lightly be discarded. First and most 
obviously, migrants are systematically sidelined from traditional domestic 
political channels. As a class of individuals, migrant workers almost invariably 
lack access to electoral processes. While many migrant workers are not 
prevented from participating in public aspects of democratic engagement (such 
as the news media, lobbying or protests), the degree of political pressure which 
migrants can exert is, nonetheless, greatly diminished by the very premise of 
popular sovereignty, which insists that democratic representatives must be 
accountable to an electorate comprised of citizens and excluding immigrants. 
Human rights law, on the other hand, does not depend on the same degree of 
political mobilisation of those who seek its protection.  
Second, it is widely acknowledged that international human rights standards 
can have a persuasive influence on domestic laws and policies.62 In particular, 
immigration policy may be especially conducive to this influence because it 
necessarily implicates a state’s relationships with other states. The interests of 
foreign states in domestic immigration admissions can be seen in the recent 
lobbying of the Australian government by Pacific Island officials seeking an 
Australian temporary labour scheme allowing Islander workers to meet seasonal 
skills shortages in Australian agricultural sectors.63 While the World Bank has 
drawn attention to the need to enhance regional development,64 international 
human rights law has not yet been deployed to bolster this argument. Framing a 
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denunciation of a state in terms of an international human rights violation may 
immediately capture the attention of foreign lawyers, foreign civil society and, 
possibly, also foreign governments. Such governments may have an interest in 
promoting the rights of their citizens abroad in a way that is not accomplished by 
reference to domestic law violations alone. It is therefore understandable that 
some who have witnessed abuses committed against undocumented migrant 
workers have urged lawyers to ‘understand and make use of international human 
rights law to avoid further deprivation of migrant worker rights’.65 
However, my argument is not that international human rights law guarantees 
a transformation of domestic laws and policies, and the lives of unauthorised 
migrants. This is because I support the scepticism of Critical Legal scholars that 
‘there are no safe havens, no areas of law — not jurisprudence, not moral 
philosophy, not constitutional law, not international law — where one will be 
embraced, where one will find wholehearted allies’.66 Instead, my contention is 
that progressive formulations of international human rights principles can be a 
useful source of legal precedent for advocates seeking to secure social change 
and law reform. It is widely acknowledged that human rights doctrine holds great 
‘discursive power’67 and ‘symbolic impact’.68 However, such doctrine will not 
hold any promise as a tool to improve the lives of irregular migrants, unless it is 
formulated in such a way as to prove itself equal to its aspirational origins and 
universalist framework. 
III THE HESITANT APPROACH OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE PROTECTION OF 
IRREGULAR MIGRANTS 
The coverage of migrants and irregular migrants under the principal human 
rights treaties has been the subject of much debate. The UN Special Rapporteur 
for the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities recently noted that the architecture of international human rights is 
built on the premise that all persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, enjoy 
certain rights.69 Furthermore, a number of commentators argue that a strong 
body of norms already exists to protect the rights of all individuals, including 
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non-citizens.70 However, recognition of the inalienable rights of all individuals in 
the immigration context seems to be systematically undermined by deference to 
states’ control over immigration policy. This has produced a chequered approach 
to the treatment of migrants. Wide-ranging analyses of the treatment of migrants 
under the core international human rights treaties have been provided 
elsewhere71 and are beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, the pervasive 
ambivalence toward the treatment of undocumented migrants under international 
human rights law is apparent in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (‘ICCPR’).72 
A Irregular Migrants and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 
The ICCPR is premised on the universality of human rights, making at times 
no distinction between the rights of citizens and non-citizens, nor distinctions 
based on immigration status.73 For instance, art 2(1) states: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized 
in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status.74 
However, at the heart of the ICCPR lies a contradiction between territorial 
sovereignty and migrants’ rights, evident for example in art 12, which provides: 
1. Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, 
have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.  
2. Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.  
The privilege accorded to territorial sovereignty in this article operates on two 
levels. First, art 12(2) epitomises the asymmetric character of the right of 
movement under international human rights law. At the same time as the 
provision recognises one aspect of a right to freedom of movement across 
boundaries (at least insofar as there is a right to leave a country) and the right of 
freedom of movement within a country, the Convention is silent on states’ 
obligations to grant entry to foreigners. Similarly, art 12(4) of the ICCPR 
provides that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country’. The UN Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) — the body established 
under the ICCPR to monitor states parties’ compliance with the Covenant — has 
issued an opinion that this implied prohibition on the right of a non-national to 
enter a country other than that of their nationality is subject to an exception for 
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immigrants who hold long-term or permanent residence status.75 The HRC thus 
accords the right to ‘return to his country’ to alien residents who have established 
‘close and enduring connections’ to the relevant country,76 although the 
exclusion of other non-nationals apparently remains. 
Second, by explicitly linking the general right of freedom of movement to 
lawful immigration status, art 12(1) establishes the basis for a hierarchy of 
entitlements accorded to individuals on the basis of their immigration status, 
which extends to other rights related to presence in a foreign country. For 
instance, unlike lawful migrants, irregular migrants have no legal right to 
challenge their expulsion on any ground whatsoever. Article 13 of the ICCPR 
provides that aliens lawfully present in a state are entitled to procedural 
protections prior to being expelled, including review by a competent authority 
and the opportunity to submit reasons against the expulsion.77 Unlike asylum 
seekers, irregular migrants are not immune from penalties for being present on 
foreign territory without authorisation on account of their illegal presence.78 It 
has been remarked that this hierarchy of protection, which accords privilege 
solely on the basis of legal status, runs counter to a number of progressive 
national policies which accord rights not on the basis of an individual’s 
immigration status, but according to the equities gained by virtue of being 
present on a state’s territory.79 
The logic of differential entitlements pervades even some of the most basic 
provisions of the ICCPR, such as its prohibition of discrimination. Article 26 
provides:  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to 
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
On its face, this non-discrimination provision is ambiguous in its extension to 
migrants as a class, since it prohibits discrimination on the basis of national and 
social origin or ‘other status’ without specifically addressing citizenship, 
alienage or immigration status. In an effort to address this uncertainty, the HRC, 
charged also with interpreting the ICCPR, has concluded that most of the 
provisions of the ICCPR generally apply to all persons in a state’s territory, 
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including aliens who are not legally present.80 However, elsewhere, the HRC has 
concluded that ‘not every differentiation of treatment will constitute 
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective 
and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant’.81 
Further, national labour market regulation, national security, public order and 
public health and safety have been considered legitimate reasons to restrict the 
rights of foreigners.82 As a result, some state practices that disproportionately 
impact upon non-citizens may not amount to discrimination if immigration status 
proves to be a relevant consideration. According to the same rationale, certain 
state practices will not be deemed ‘arbitrary’, and therefore contrary to law, as 
long as they are directed solely against migrants. For example, the prohibition in 
art 9(1) of ‘arbitrary arrest and detention’ cannot be read as prohibiting all 
detentions of irregular migrants. It is clear that states’ border control powers 
alone provide a reasonable basis upon which to discriminate against irregular 
migrants.  
It can be seen, therefore, that the international protection of undocumented 
migrants depends on a tension between the concerns of international human 
rights and states’ territorial sovereignty. The doctrine of territorial sovereignty 
permits states to exercise exclusive control over their physical domain.83 
Certainly, this power is said to be subject to limitations imposed by international 
law, and human rights might be thought to operate here, as in other contexts, as a 
check on state sovereignty. However, when it comes to the treatment of 
non-citizens, human rights norms appear to give way to another incident of 
territorial sovereignty — the long-established principle of international law that 
gives states discretion over the reception and exclusion of aliens.84 As Linda 
Bosniak has noted, when dealing with undocumented migrants, human rights 
interests contend not just with states’ arguments about their jurisdictional 
authority over domestic affairs but also with this substantive aspect of 
sovereignty — states’ expansive territorial powers, including their virtually 
uncontested authority to control the admission and exclusion of aliens and grant 
nationality — in effect, to prescribe the composition of the national 
community.85 
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B The Innovation Presented by the Migrant Workers Convention 
  
When the Migrant Workers Convention entered into force on 1 July 2003,86 it 
was acclaimed as ‘the most ambitious statement to date of international concern 
for the problematic condition of undocumented migrants’.87 It covers both lawful 
and irregular migrants and provides the first international definition of ‘irregular 
migrant workers’.88 Furthermore, the Migrant Workers Convention expressly 
recognises that 
workers who are non-documented or in an irregular situation are frequently 
employed under less favourable conditions of work than other workers and that 
certain employers find this an inducement to seek such labour in order to reap the 
benefits of competition.89 
The Migrant Workers Convention explicitly articulates a broad range of 
human rights for undocumented migrant workers and members of their families, 
far surpassing any protections afforded to them previously. Rights in Part III of 
the Migrant Workers Convention apply to all migrant workers, irregular as well 
as regular, and include: the right to enjoy treatment that is at least equal to 
nationals of the state of employment in respect of remuneration;90 the right to 
enforce employment contracts against employers;91 the right to join trade 
unions;92 the right to emergency medical care;93 and the right to basic education, 
regardless of a child’s or parents’ irregular status.94 The Migrant Workers 
Convention emphasises that these rights apply to all migrant workers, irregular as 
well as regular and, further, that states parties are obliged to ensure that ‘migrant 
workers are not deprived of any [of these] rights … by reason of any irregularity 
in their stay or employment’.95 
However, lest it be thought that the Migrant Workers Convention rejects the 
doctrine of national sovereignty, the Convention does differentiate the rights 
accorded to undocumented and documented migrants. The protections due to all 
migrants (contained in Part III of the Migrant Workers Convention) fall short of 
broader protections owed to lawful migrants, which are separately enumerated in 
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Part IV. Unlike regular migrants, the undocumented have no rights to: liberty of 
movement;96 family unity;97 to form associations and trade unions;98 or 
protection from abusive expulsions.99 Strikingly, there is no general prohibition 
on discrimination on the basis of immigration status.100 
States’ concern to police their borders featured prominently in debates during 
the drafting of the Migrant Workers Convention,101 making these concessions 
unsurprising. Indeed, even with the compromise to border protection offered by 
this tiered structure, the ratification record of the Migrant Workers Convention is 
extremely low in comparison with other UN human rights instruments.102 This 
low ratification record has been identified as a major weakness of the Migrant 
Workers Convention.103 Consequently, a great deal of attention has been directed 
to illuminating the obstacles to ratification of the Migrant Workers 
Convention.104 Sending states are driven to protect their nationals living abroad 
and signing onto this convention forms part of that strategy. However, thus far, 
no major receiving state, including the US, Australia, or any European state, has 
ratified the Migrant Workers Convention, asserting that it is too ambitious.105 
Presumably, receiving states have baulked at the significant protections accorded 
to irregular migrant workers. However, it bears reflection that the distinction 
between sending states and receiving states can be quite fluid. Indeed, certain 
states parties to the Migrant Workers Convention were primarily sending 
countries at the time of ratification but increasingly have become points of 
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reception for migrants.106 Morocco, for example, has become a major transit 
country for population flows from West Africa to Europe, which has resulted in 
the presence of a significant number of undocumented migrants within its 
borders.107 Nevertheless, this is not the only barrier to the Migrant Workers 
Convention’s coverage of irregular migrant workers.  
The apparent privileging of lawful migrant workers over unauthorised 
workers is not the only concession to states’ traditional prerogative over border 
control. The Migrant Workers Convention repeatedly affirms the 
immigration-specific aspects of territorial sovereignty. It permits states parties to 
pursue immigration control policies that they see fit,108 and requires them to take 
measures ‘with a view to preventing and eliminating illegal or clandestine 
movements and employment of migrant workers in an irregular situation’.109 
Contracting states are explicitly not obliged to regularise the status of irregular 
migrant workers,110 and it is made clear that undocumented immigrants are not 
exempted from ‘the obligation to comply with the laws and regulations of any 
State of transit and State of employment’,111 which naturally include domestic 
laws against unauthorised entry, employment or residence. 
From these provisions, Linda Bosniak has extrapolated that the Migrant 
Workers Convention navigates the conflict between human rights and state 
sovereignty by distinguishing between two different domains: state immigration 
power over admission and exclusion, and state treatment of migrants under other 
areas of the law.112 When it comes to the admission and expulsion of aliens — 
the domain of the border — Bosniak argues that the conflict has been resolved in 
favour of states, as their interests in curbing irregular migration are affirmed, 
along with their sovereign prerogative over migrants’ entry and exclusion.113 Yet 
when it comes to migrants’ rights in areas other than immigration, the Migrant 
Workers Convention requires states to protect the basic rights of undocumented 
migrants, even if the rights are not identical to those accorded to its citizens or 
lawful residents. Article 79 reflects this bifurcated approach: 
Nothing in the present Convention shall affect the right of each State Party to 
establish the criteria governing admission of migrant workers and members of 
their families. Concerning other matters related to their legal situation and 
treatment as migrant workers and members of their families, States Parties shall 
be subject to the limitations set forth in the present Convention. 
During the drafting of the Migrant Workers Convention, delegates in a 
working group riven by divisions in this controversial area broadly agreed that it 
should not effectively force states parties to regularise the status of illegal 
migrant workers or grant an amnesty.114 The delegates held that sovereign 
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prerogative over immigration must remain intact.115 The resulting Migrant 
Workers Convention attempts to strike this balance. It seeks to provide full 
assurance to states that their sovereign powers are not in jeopardy without 
frustrating the ultimate objective to guarantee human rights for migrants. 
The trouble is that these two domains — regulation of entry, on the one hand, 
and substantive protections in other areas of law, on the other — are inextricably 
linked. The way in which the Migrant Workers Convention mediates this 
connection seriously limits its ability to provide effective protection to irregular 
migrants. Essentially, the problem is this: the provisions which protect states’ 
sovereign prerogatives to control immigration are so wide-ranging that they end 
up infiltrating the domain of undocumented migrants’ substantive protections in 
other areas of domestic law, thus effectively defeating their enforceability. 
The way in which states’ border control powers ultimately trump the rights 
provisions can be seen through the prism of the protection afforded by art 25(3) 
of undocumented migrants’ legal and contractual rights with respect to 
employers. This provision purports to assure enforceable employment rights to 
irregular migrants, notwithstanding their irregular status, by prohibiting 
employers from evading their obligations to migrant workers ‘by reason of any 
such irregularity’.116 But if, in response to an undocumented employee’s efforts 
to assert her rights an employer decides to notify the state’s immigration 
officials, the state is free to prosecute the immigrant for violations of its 
immigration laws.117 There is nothing in the Migrant Workers Convention which 
protects undocumented migrants from prosecution for immigration violations 
based on information obtained in the course of the migrants’ exercise of their 
rights under the same Convention. As provided in art 34: 
Nothing in [Part III] of the present Convention shall have the effect of relieving 
migrant workers and the members of their families from … the obligation to 
comply with the laws and regulations of … the state of employment. 
Similarly, when an irregular migrant worker asserts a right under the Migrant 
Workers Convention against a state party, the state is obliged under the 
Convention to facilitate the enjoyment of this right.118 However, the state is 
simultaneously free under the Migrant Workers Convention to demand to know a 
migrant worker’s immigration status which could lead to expulsion or 
punishment for immigration-related violations.119  
In the Western world, the dictates of stringent border control seem so natural 
that we are accustomed to conceiving of migrants’ rights as inevitably yielding to 
this state interest. Against this backdrop, the balance struck by the Migrant 
Workers Convention may appear fair. However, the Migrant Workers 
Convention handles this tension much more delicately when it comes to the 
rights of authorised migrant workers. Article 56 stipulates that ‘expulsion shall 
not be resorted to for the purpose of depriving’ authorised migrant workers of 
rights arising from their residence and employment. In so doing, it quarantines a 
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state’s discretion over migrant entry from the substantive obligations owed to 
migrants once they have entered the state. This approach is precisely what is 
needed to give effective protection to undocumented workers, but it is reserved 
for documented migrant workers only.  
According to the doctrine of the Migrant Workers Convention, the 
relationship between undocumented migrants and the state at the border, in 
regulating entry and exclusion, infiltrates the relationship between them in the 
domain of substantive protections in other areas of domestic law. This barrier to 
enforcement seriously impairs the Migrant Workers Convention’s capacity to 
improve the social condition of undocumented migrants.  
IV SEEKING OUT MORE PROGRESSIVE DOCTRINE: THE REGIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS COURTS 
To be of practical benefit to irregular migrants, international human rights 
standards must quarantine a migrant’s immigration status from his or her ability 
to seek effective protection under other areas of the law once in a state of 
employment. In a sense, this limitation is bound up in the strength of the doctrine 
of state sovereignty in the international arena. However, this outcome is not 
unique to international law. A great many domestic laws also allow the absolute 
discretion of states to regulate entry at the border to infect their treatment of 
irregular migrant workers once present in a country of employment. For instance, 
s 76 of the German Foreigners Law requires ‘all public offices’ to notify 
immigration officials of irregular migration status120 — with the result that this 
lack of confidentiality discourages unauthorised immigrant workers from making 
wage claims to industrial tribunals. 
The question remains whether any such separation is possible. It is significant 
that the Migrant Workers Convention was ‘promulgated under the auspices of 
the UN’, an institution which is comprised of individual states stridently 
committed to state sovereignty.121 As we will see, the rights of undocumented 
migrants have been elaborated much more progressively in forums at a distance 
from the influence of states and the overriding goal of preserving sovereignty. In 
regional human rights courts, in Europe and the Americas, the absolute 
discretion of states to regulate entry at the border is being decoupled from the 
substantive rights of irregular migrant workers once present in their countries of 
employment.  
Structurally, international or regional courts seem better placed than 
international treaty law to articulate standards that are responsive to the 
protection needs of migrants. An analogy may be drawn with domestic courts, 
which are often attributed a key role in the expansion of migrant rights due to 
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their insulation from democratic majority pressures.122 Lacking citizenship, 
migrants are almost always excluded from direct access to parliamentary law 
reform through the traditional democratic route of voting.123 While migrants may 
be free to assert rights through other forms of civic participation and political 
mobilisation, in any contest with the rights claims of citizens, elected 
representatives will almost invariably accord priority to their constituents.124 
After all, the very principle of popular sovereignty requires that the law respond 
to the will of citizens, as expressed through electoral processes and voiced 
through conflict between mobilised interest groups.125 Democratically 
accountable governments are therefore susceptible to populist pressures that 
readily absorb racist and xenophobic sentiments.126 Courts, on the other hand, to 
some extent, are ‘less determined and more insulated both from concrete social 
interests and from political struggle taking place in other state institutions’.127  
Judicially mediated doctrine can be seen to recognise the unique vulnerability 
of undocumented migrants and restrain states’ immigration power. Both the 
ECHR and the IACHR have not only recognised that irregular migrants hold 
substantive rights vis-à-vis their host state but have also enjoined states to 
sequester migrants’ unlawful immigration status from their ability to claim these 
rights. These two courts accomplish this in very different ways in the context of 
the relevant provisions of the regional human rights convention. Nevertheless, 
the bodies of jurisprudence are similar in that they both suggest ways to avoid 
the shortcoming of the Migrant Workers Convention, whereby the substantive 
protections offered to irregular migrants are apparently compromised by an 
inability to claim them. 
A European Jurisprudence on the Right to Family Life 
The Council of Europe was established in 1949 in response to the atrocities of 
the Second World War to promote unity, social and economic progress and 
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human rights in Europe.128 The Council promptly created the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (‘European 
Convention’), which was adopted in 1950.129 The addition of Protocol 11 to the 
European Convention in 1998 dramatically changed the ECHR’s structural 
system of enforcement.130 Protocol 11 created an absolute right for individuals or 
non-governmental organisations to petition the ECHR131 which has the power to 
issue decisions regarding European Convention violations and to order the 
offending state to pay compensation and costs to the applicant.132 The ECHR 
may receive applications from ‘any person, non-governmental organisation or 
group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation’ committed by one 
of the contracting states.133 
Notwithstanding this broad jurisdiction, the European human rights regime 
does not necessarily protect people regardless of the passport they hold. Under 
the European Convention, like the ICCPR, political rights are explicitly reserved 
for citizens.134 From 1959, when the ECHR started functioning, until December 
1993, fewer than a dozen decisions involved the civil rights of foreigners.135 Nor 
has Europe promulgated any specialised protective standards for unauthorised 
migrant workers. The European Social Charter136 protections for migrants and 
the European Convention on the Legal Status of Migrant Workers137 in their 
terms apply only to the nationals of other contracting parties, who are, by 
definition, legally working as a matter of regional immigration law.138 Ryszard 
Cholewinski has observed that the Migrant Workers Convention contains the 
‘minimum standard of treatment for illegal migrants in Europe, who are 
presently ignored by analogous European standards’.139 
Yet, even though the ECHR has no express mandate to protect unauthorised 
immigrant workers, a body of jurisprudence bolstering the rights of migrants has 
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emerged. Among other areas, significant case law has developed around the 
application of art 8 of the European Convention, which protects the right to 
respect for private and family life:  
1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this 
right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
Clearly, art 8 does not guarantee foreigners the right to a family home in their 
country of choice. As a recent International Labour Organisation report observes, 
states ‘are not bound by any provision of international law to guarantee family 
reunification’.140 In all of its decisions, the ECHR reaffirms that it does not 
forbid states from regulating immigration and details a number of legitimate 
reasons for states to restrict immigration, including the economic well-being of a 
country and threats to public order. These restrictions are applicable if ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’.141  
However, the ECHR does recognise that any exercise of immigration control 
must be compatible with art 8,142 and has repeatedly found that the decision to 
expel a non-citizen may prima facie constitute an ‘interference’ with the right to 
respect for family life.143 The Court then assesses the proportionality between 
the legitimate goal of a measure or a law, the means used to achieve this goal and 
the damage done to the individual as measured by the violation of European 
Convention rights.144 In doing so, the Court considers both the individual’s 
interest in ‘respect for his private or family life’ and the government’s need to 
control disorder and crime.145 
In balancing these interests, a number of considerations are taken into 
account. These include: the amount of time a non-national has lived in the 
deporting state; whether his or her family resides there; whether he or she has 
any ties to another state; and the effect of deportation on his or her family in the 
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deporting state.146 The ECHR also considers the seriousness of any criminal 
offence committed by the applicant and the applicant’s police record since the 
crime.147 One line of authority also requires the Court to investigate whether the 
disruption or threat of disruption to family life is caused by an action or situation 
for which the persons concerned, and not the state, carry the primary 
responsibility.148 
Due to these considerations, the case law developed in relation to art 8 has 
been developed most prominently in the context of long-term or permanent 
resident aliens. One of the first successful attempts to invoke art 8 in a 
deportation case was the challenge to expulsion brought by Mr Berrehab after his 
marriage dissolved and his residence permit was revoked.149 The ECHR found 
that his expulsion would violate art 8(1) because it would interrupt settled access 
between father and child.150 Although immigration control was an interference 
that was in accordance with the law and had the legitimate aim of preserving the 
country’s economic well-being within the meaning of art 8(2), the Netherlands 
had failed to justify this expulsion as necessary in a democratic society.151 As a 
result, it did not represent a fair balance between the public interest and the rights 
of the family concerned.152 
Shortly thereafter, the European Commission of Human Rights issued a 
pronouncement on the application of art 8 to aliens, which was striking in its 
characterisation of the relationship between a non-citizen and his country of 
residence. In the case of Djeroud,153 the Algerian applicant had been convicted 
of a series of serious offences in France and was issued with numerous 
deportation orders. Yet the European Commission of Human Rights upheld his 
complaint, attributing particular significance to his presence in France since 
infancy, notwithstanding his migrant status: 
Although legally an alien, the applicant has his family and social ties in France and 
the nationality which links him to Algeria, though a legal reality, does not reflect 
his actual position in human terms.154 
This statement is remarkable in its willingness to look behind the applicant’s 
legal immigration status and accord weight to his factual presence in a state of 
residence.  
However, the ECHR has been far more hesitant to take this approach where 
the applicant’s presence has been continually unauthorised. Until very recently, 
Dalia v France was one of the only judgments issued by the ECHR ruling on the 
applicability of art 8 to the exclusion of an irregular migrant.155 In that instance, 
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the Court found that the exclusion of Ms Dalia, an irregular migrant convicted of 
heroin trafficking, did not violate art 8. Although this result was disappointing 
for Ms Dalia, what is significant about this case was that her irregular status was 
not decisive. While unlawfully present in France, she had given birth to a son (a 
French citizen). The Court concluded that removing Dalia from a country where 
a close member of her family lived prima facie amounted to an interference in 
her family life.156 Her unlawful status at the time did not affect this finding. Ms 
Dalia’s case failed because of her inability to show, under art 8(2), that her 
deportation was not proportionate to a legitimate aim pursued in a democratic 
society. In light of her serious crime and her extensive social ties in Algeria, 
referring to ‘her Algerian nationality [as] not merely a legal fact but reflect[ing] 
certain social and emotional links’, the Court decided against her.157  
The ECHR seemed to strike a delicate balance with regard to the significance 
of Ms Dalia’s undocumented status. Ms Dalia’s illegal presence was apparently 
irrelevant to the Court’s consideration of the birth of her son in France and the 
prima facie interference that her removal would have on her relationship with 
him.158 However, the Court refused to accord substantial weight to this 
relationship when it came to ruling on the second element of the art 8 test.159 The 
reason for this is not clear. It may be that the Court simply considered that the 
applicant’s relationship with her son was not so significant as to outweigh 
France’s legitimate aim of removing a migrant with a criminal record. Indeed, 
the Court used very strong language when describing the social detriment caused 
by her drug-related offences.160 On the other hand, it is possible that the Court 
was suggesting that states have a greater interest in expelling undocumented 
migrants than lawful migrants and that, had Ms Dalia been living in France with 
lawful immigrant status, her removal from her son would have been considered 
disproportionate to any legitimate aim advanced by France. 
The precise content of a state’s interest in controlling irregular migration was 
considered most recently in a decision concerning an application brought by Ms 
Solange Rodrigues da Silva, a Brazilian mother living and working illegally in 
the Netherlands, and her Dutch daughter, Rachael Hoogkamer. On 31 January 
2006, the ECHR ruled unanimously that the refusal to grant Ms Rodrigues da 
Silva a residence permit amounted to a violation of her right to private and 
family life under art 8.161  
In its submissions to the ECHR, the Government of the Netherlands had 
emphasised the national interests at stake.162 Defending the refusal, the 
Netherlands had maintained, in particular, that the applicant, who was working 
illegally, did not pay taxes or social security contributions, and that there were 
ample European Union nationals or lawful migrants in the Netherlands to fill the 
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job she was occupying.163 On these bases, the Deputy Minister of Justice and the 
Regional Court of the Hague had both considered that the interests of the 
economic well-being of the country outweighed Ms Rodrigues da Silva’s right to 
reside in the Netherlands — her daughter’s state of nationality.164  
Nevertheless, the ECHR held that Ms Rodrigues da Silva’s expulsion would 
have far-reaching consequences on her family life with her young daughter and 
that it was clearly in Rachael’s best interests for her mother to stay in the 
Netherlands.165 After the relationship between Ms Rodrigues da Silva and Mr 
Hoogkamer had dissolved, custody of Rachael had been awarded to her father. 
This was decided on the basis that Rachael’s interests were best served by 
remaining in the Netherlands and that there was no guarantee, due to Ms 
Rodrigues da Silva’s irregular migration status, that her mother would be in a 
position to continue residing there to care for her.166 The ECHR determined, as a 
result of this custody decision, that deporting Ms Rodrigues da Silva would sever 
almost all contact with Rachael, who would remain in the Netherlands. The fact 
that Rachael would not be able to live with her mother in Brazil loomed large in 
the Court’s balancing test of the proportionality of the visa refusal decision.167 
The ECHR then turned to the significance of Ms Rodrigues da Silva’s 
irregular immigration status. At no point had Ms Rodrigues da Silva been 
entitled to a right of lawful presence in the Netherlands.168 The Court took into 
account the fact that Ms Rodrigues da Silva and Mr Hoogkamer were both 
aware, from the outset of their relationship, that the continued existence of their 
family life within the Netherlands was precarious because of her illegal 
immigration status.169 In the balancing test, it could be imagined that this would 
create an equity against Ms Rodrigues da Silva since this ‘illegality was mainly 
the result of the first applicant’s own actions, or lack thereof’.170 However, the 
ECHR declined to take such an approach, holding instead that: 
Lawful residence in the Netherlands would have been possible on the basis of the 
fact that the first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer had a lasting relationship between 
June 1994 and January 1997. Although there is no doubt that a serious reproach 
may be made of the first applicant’s cavalier attitude to Dutch immigration rules, 
this case should be distinguished from others in which the Court considered that 
the persons concerned could not have any time reasonably expected to be able to 
continue family life in the host country.171 
The ECHR ultimately determined that: 
the economic well-being of the country does not outweigh the applicants’ rights 
under Article 8, despite the fact that the first applicant was residing illegally in the 
Netherlands at the time of Rachael’s birth. Indeed, by attaching such paramount 
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importance to this latter element, the authorities may be considered to have 
indulged in excessive formalism.172 
It has been suggested that ECHR jurisprudence generally provides a valuable 
framework for the determination of the rights of irregular migrants, because, 
when a deportation places obstacles to the unity of a family, the margin of 
appreciation afforded to states in immigration control markedly narrows.173 
Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v the Netherlands represents a further 
conceptual advancement in judicial gloss on states’ margin of appreciation when 
regulating illegal migration for three reasons. First, the applicants’ challenge 
before the ECHR related not to a deportation order but to the Minister’s refusal 
to grant residency. This means that, in finding in favour of the applicants, the 
ECHR held that irregular migrants’ right to family life can engage a positive 
obligation to permit residence on the part of host states. Secondly, the judgment 
explicitly extends the entitlements of undocumented migrants to include family-
based rights, where the Migrant Workers Convention had afforded the right to 
family unity to regular migrants alone.174 Thirdly, the Court, in this case, 
approaches unlawful immigration status in a vein similar to Djeroud,175 
attributing value to Ms Rodrigues da Silva’s factual presence in the Netherlands 
and her putative right to have regularised her situation in the past, rather than 
relying on her strict legal status alone.176 To have fixed attention on her current 
immigration status would have been, in the words of the Court, to have engaged 
in ‘excessive formalism’.177  
In these ways, the ECHR has established standards which avoid the 
enforcement pitfalls of the Migrant Workers Convention framework. Rather than 
invoking formal rights which irregular migrants are unable to access for fear of 
detection, the jurisprudence concerning the European Convention provides that 
states may be obliged to grant full residence to undocumented migrants to 
safeguard their right to family unity.178 Irregular status alone does not dislodge a 
reasonable expectation to be able to continue family life in the host country. By 
way of comparison, the human rights regime in the Americas, although taking a 
markedly different approach, also manages to protect migrants’ rights, 
notwithstanding their unauthorised status. 
B The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
In its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Status and Rights of Undocumented 
Migrants (‘Advisory Opinion’) of 17 September 2003, the IACHR ruled that 
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international principles of non-discrimination provide workplace protections for 
undocumented migrant workers.179  
The background to the Advisory Opinion was the 2002 US Supreme Court 
case of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc v National Labor Relations Board 
(‘Hoffman Plastic’).180 This case arose after José Castro, an irregular Mexican 
worker at a plastics factory in the US, was illegally fired for union organising.181 
The US National Labor Relations Board (‘NLRB’) held that the employer’s 
decision to fire the worker had violated the applicable domestic labour protection 
laws.182 A dispute then arose between the employer and the NLRB over the 
remedies — the employer argued that Mr Castro was not entitled to 
compensation for the time he missed work since he had not legally been entitled 
to work under immigration law.183  
The Supreme Court ruled that Mr Castro’s unlawful immigration status 
displaced his right to recover back pay for lost wages (which was the only direct 
remedy available to him for wrongful dismissal). In the Court’s view, the 
imperatives of immigration enforcement justified this carve out in labour 
protections. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the 
NLRB could not order back pay for unperformed work which the worker could 
not lawfully have undertaken, because such remedies encourage illegal 
immigration.184 On the other hand, the dissenting judgments took a more 
pragmatic approach. They pointed out that full remedies would actually further 
the objectives of immigration control by discouraging employers from hiring 
undocumented workers.185 It was argued that equal enforcement of labour laws 
on par with the protections enjoyed by authorised workers would raise the cost 
for employers and thus reduce the economic incentive to hire undocumented 
workers.186 
The Mexican Government responded to this decision through diplomatic 
channels, conveying its concern about the impact of the decision on Mexicans 
working in the US. The response provides an exceptional example of the 
deployment of international human rights strategies in shaping foreign policy, 
especially those related to international population flows. Mexico then sought an 
advisory opinion from the IACHR on the rights of undocumented workers, as 
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this was the only legal mechanism open to it.187. Since the US had not ratified 
the American Convention on Human Rights (‘American Convention’),188 the 
dispute could not fall within the contentious jurisdiction of the IACHR. 
The Advisory Opinion has been described as ‘a watershed’ for undocumented 
migrants.189 In a unanimous opinion, the Court found that the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination prohibit the denial of human rights to migrants 
on the basis of their immigration status.190 Indeed, the Court concluded that 
non-discrimination norms have the status of jus cogens, or peremptory norms of 
international law.191 This was the first time an international tribunal had reached 
this conclusion, which imposes obligations erga omnes on all states.192 The 
IACHR acknowledged that governments have the sovereign right to deny 
employment to undocumented immigrants,193 but held that, once an employment 
relationship is established, such workers are equally protected by human rights in 
the workplace.194  
The decision was based partly on art 24 of the American Convention, which 
provides that ‘[a]ll persons are equal before the law. Consequently, all persons 
are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law’, as well as 
arts 3(1) and 17 of the Charter of the Organization of American States 
(proclaiming human rights for all without discrimination); art 2 of the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man195 (equality before the law); arts 1, 
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2(1) and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’)196 (the 
principles of human dignity, non-discrimination and equality before the law); 
and arts 2(1), 2(2), 5(2) and 26 of the ICCPR (general obligations to implement 
the Covenant with non-derogation and equality before the law, and without 
discrimination).197  
The IACHR had earlier addressed the applicability of art 24 to non-nationals, 
distinguishing discrimination from the mere act of noting differences or factual 
inequalities.198 In discerning whether differences in legal treatment amount to 
discrimination, the Court had suggested it would evaluate whether the 
differences are ‘in themselves offensive to human dignity’, or whether they had a 
‘legitimate purpose’ that would not ‘lead to situations which are contrary to 
justice, to reason or to the nature of things’.199  
In the Advisory Opinion, the IACHR drew upon this principle of equality and 
non-discrimination, reiterating that states may, in accordance with art 24, grant 
some ‘distinct treatment’ between undocumented migrants and documented 
migrants, or between migrants and nationals.200 However, expanding on its 
earlier dicta, the IAHCR maintained that the differential treatment is only 
permissible to the extent that it is ‘reasonable, objective, proportionate and does 
not harm human rights’.201 By way of concrete example, the Court 
acknowledged that states are permitted to distinguish between nationals and 
non-nationals in terms of who has the right to employment,202 but once 
‘undocumented workers are engaged, they immediately become possessors of the 
labour rights corresponding to workers and may not be discriminated against 
because of their irregular situation’.203 Migrant workers are entitled to workers’ 
rights because these rights derive from the individual being engaged in 
renumerated work, regardless of the background context coloured by the 
individual’s immigration status. States may not further their immigration policies 
by denying basic workplace protections to undocumented employees. 
On its face, this prohibition on employment-related discrimination appears to 
go no further than the corresponding stipulation in the Migrant Workers 
Convention.204 However, it constitutes a significant advancement for several 
reasons. First, the IACHR substantially enlarges the rights owed to 
undocumented migrant workers under the Migrant Workers Convention. It 
extends the obligation not to discriminate in regards to: the payment of fair 
wages for work performed; reasonable working hours; safe and healthy working 
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conditions; social security; a right to rest and compensation; protection for 
women workers; judicial and administrative guarantees;205 access to state health 
services; and contributions to state pension systems.206 In contrast, the Migrant 
Workers Convention reserves several of these rights for regular migrants only.207 
No doubt in reference to the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hoffman Plastic, 
Judge Ramírez especially emphasised the obligation to provide due process and 
unrestricted access to effective judicial remedies to migrant workers for 
violations of workplace rights: 
undocumented workers usually face severe problems of effective access to justice. 
These problems are due not only to cultural factors and lack of adequate resources 
or knowledge to claim protection from the authorities with competence to provide 
it, but also to the existence of norms or practices that obstruct or limit delivery of 
justice by the State. This happens because the request for justice can lead to 
reprisals against the applicants by authorities or individuals, measure of coercion 
or detention, threats of deportation, imprisonment or other measures that, 
unfortunately, are frequently experienced by undocumented migrants.208 
Second, in a sweeping judgment, undocumented workers have gained 
non-discrimination protection based on a broad body of human rights law, 
including the ICCPR and the UDHR, rather than the poorly-ratified Migrant 
Workers Convention.209 This was accomplished by the IACHR’s reliance on the 
general principles of equality and non-discrimination and its determination that 
the applicability of these protections extend to unauthorised migrant workers, 
notwithstanding their ‘definitional status as lawbreakers’.210 Indeed, it has been 
observed that, as a result of the Court’s opinion in this matter, 
whilst only eight of the thirty-five … [Organization of American States] member 
states are parties to the … [Migrant Workers Convention], those states which are 
not have at least been openly advised that they must in large part observe the 
obligations enshrined therein.211 
Finally, the decision of the IACHR is explicitly geared towards ensuring the 
effective exercise of human rights by undocumented migrant workers on equal 
footing with all other workers in the state of employment. In this respect, it 
appears to go further than the Migrant Workers Convention by requiring that 
irregular migrants be able to enforce workplace rights without fear of 
immigration-related retaliation. This is a departure from the more nominal or 
formal approach that was the outcome of the uneasy compromise brokered in 
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drafting the Migrant Workers Convention.212 According to the Court, when fear 
of deportation or denial of free public legal services to immigrants prevents 
immigrants from asserting their rights, the right to judicial protection is 
violated.213 In particular, Judge Ramírez stated that governments should not 
sanction violations of immigration law with measures unrelated to the migratory 
offence:  
Non-compliance with migratory provisions would entail the relevant 
consequences, but should not produce effects in areas that are unrelated to the 
matter of the entry and residence of migrants.214 
Here, the Court is de-coupling the protections necessary to alleviate the 
vulnerable position of undocumented migrants while working in their host state 
from the infraction against domestic law. 
V CONCLUSION 
Migrants who live or work without authorisation lead extremely precarious 
lives. Many migrants face structural barriers such as language difficulties or lack 
understanding about local institutions and laws.215 However, irregular migrants 
occupy positions of even more extreme social vulnerability since they often work 
in undesirable jobs avoided by nationals and legal migrants, and live in constant 
fear of removal or possible prosecution as a result of their unlawful status.216 In 
an effort to assist advocates to promote the rights of undocumented migrants, this 
article has identified bodies of jurisprudence developed by regional human rights 
courts which represent major conceptual advancements in the international 
standards of treatment of unauthorised migrants.  
My purpose in canvassing progressive doctrine emanating from the case law 
of regional human rights courts is not to suggest that these forums guarantee 
redress for rights violations experienced by undocumented workers. Nor do I 
claim that litigation before these regional bodies signals the only way forward for 
advocates seeking to assist undocumented migrants in attaining justice. Just 
outcomes for claimants appearing before these international forums require 
enforcement mechanisms which do not yet exist at the international level. In the 
case of the IACHR, jurisprudence emanating from its advisory jurisdiction is not 
binding.217 Indeed, the US has taken no steps to reinstate direct remedies for 
undocumented workers fired in violation of labour laws, as required by the 
IACHR pursuant to the ICCPR. In relation to the ECHR, the inconsistency of its 
case law has been disparaged as amounting to a ‘lottery’.218 In part, this is due to 
the source of the rights itself, art 8, which has been described as ‘easily the most 
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comprehensive yet obscure provision of the Convention’.219 At the same time, it 
is a result of the case by case approach taken to art 8 cases, which has received a 
great deal of criticism from dissenting judges.220 Moreover, although the 
ECHR’s attention to immigrants’ rights has encouraged a degree of legislative 
reform within member states,221 the ECHR has no power to award anything other 
than compensation and costs — it cannot order the state to take, or refrain from 
taking, any particular action.222 
Given the significant enforcement limitations of the international human 
rights system, much depends on whether and how advocates take up the 
discourse of rights. My aim in exploring the jurisprudence issuing from these 
regional bodies is to provide advocates with a language and a conceptual 
framework through which to engage states and international organisations. 
Opportunities for advocacy are many. Indeed, the Committee on Migrant 
Workers, established pursuant to the Migrant Workers Convention, will soon 
begin to issue general comments interpreting the precise contours of the 
obligations of states parties.223 Since so many domestic legal systems rely on the 
doctrine of territorial sovereignty in determining the rights of migrants, the fact 
that this doctrine finds its source in international law makes domestic policy 
especially susceptible to developments in international law that restrict the 
prerogative of the sovereign. 
This article has explored the ways in which both the ECHR and IACHR have 
significantly departed from the logic of international human rights law treaties by 
recognising that, in order to provide effective protection, the undocumented 
migrant’s immigration status must be quarantined from his or her ability to claim 
substantive rights. Nevertheless, this acknowledgement poses a real challenge as 
to how to accomplish this objective. While both bodies of jurisprudence read 
down the significance of unauthorised immigration status in claiming certain 
substantive rights, they propose quite different conceptual frameworks.  
The Advisory Opinion of the IACHR suggests that certain rights of 
undocumented workers should not be affected by their unlawful immigration 
status. It distinguishes immigration enforcement policies that violate the human 
rights of undocumented workers from those that do not. The IACHR observes 
that states may deny immigrants some political rights, regulate the entry and 
deportation of undocumented migrants, deny them permission to work and 
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regulate the entry and residence of guest workers in particular economic 
sectors.224 However, once an employment relationship has been established, the 
migrant acquires rights as a worker irrespective of his or her irregular status in 
the state of employment.225 When it comes to enforcing these protected 
workplace rights, the IACHR suggests the need for unauthorised workers to be 
guaranteed immigration confidentiality. In other words, according to the IACHR, 
undocumented workers have certain rights as workers notwithstanding their lack 
of status as members of the political community in their country of employment. 
Further analysis is required to structure a concrete basis for determining 
workplace rights which cannot be denied on the basis of migration status and 
those which can.  
The ECHR takes a markedly different perspective by linking the rights held 
by irregular migrants to their standing as members of European state 
communities. Whereas the IACHR found that undocumented migrants lack 
membership status (and sought to quarantine this position from migrants’ ability 
to enforce workplace protections), the ECHR ruled that migrants’ constant 
presence and social ties create a de facto citizenship. Indeed, the equities gained 
by continuous presence and local family relationships may include a reasonable 
expectation to be able to continue family life in the host country.  
Both bodies of jurisprudence suggest novel approaches which assist lawyers 
and policy-makers as they continue to evolve standards and remedies which offer 
effective protection against grave abuses of rights. Under both international law 
and domestic laws, these standards will inevitably grapple with the philosophical 
tensions raised by the presence of unauthorised migrants, including whether or 
not they are granted status as community members in the state of employment 
and whether or not that matters.  
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